show that the refined simulations and activities help students learn the basic principles of QKD at both the introductory and advanced undergraduate levels.
already available.
Quantum mechanics courses often only discuss quantum information in advanced courses.
We argue that aspects of quantum information can profitably be covered much earlier.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the simplest demonstrations of the emerging and rapidly growing field of quantum information technology. In the most common form (see section II), it does not require complicated mathematics, and only requires a knowledge of basic quantum mechanics concepts such as superposition states and their measurement outcome probabilities, incompatible observables, the collapse of a quantum state on measurement, and a physical quantum system with two states as a realization of a qubit. It also links well with the spins-first or more generally two-level systems approach gaining favor in quantum mechanics instruction, where topics such as single photons or spin 1/2 particles that are physical realizations of qubits are covered early in the curriculum. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] While QKD relies on the no-cloning theorem, our experience is that QKD can be discussed at the introductory level without proving this theorem. QKD is a topic with direct everyday applications well known to students (such as secure internet communication), and thus helps to make a subject that can often appear abstract and far-removed from everyday experience relevant to students' lives.
Despite distinct advantages of incorporating aspects of quantum information into quantum mechanics courses, many textbooks do not include this topic, and very limited numbers of multimedia resources and research-based materials exist compared with other quantum mechanics topics. 15, 16 This article gives an overview of interactive simulations developed as teaching of the basic principles of quantum key distribution using three different protocols.
The simulations use polarized single photons and spin 1/2 particles as physical realizations of qubits. Simulations can be used both at the introductory and advanced levels, and are also aimed at instructors with other areas of expertise interested in learning the principles of QKD. Simulations have been coded in HTML5/Javascript, so that they run on a wide range of devices including tablets and PCs. All of the QuVis simulations and accompanying activities are freely available for use online or download (www.st-andrews.ac.uk/physics/quvis).
Instructors can download password-protected solutions to activities from the QuVis website. Instructors interested in obtaining the password for the solutions are requested to email quvismail@st-andrews.ac.uk.
The simulations described here have a number of features that make them useful for learning about QKD. They allow students to experience how a raw key would be generated experimentally and to see the effect of an eavesdropper infiltrating the experiment. Students can easily set up different configurations, such as using only a single basis or two bases and see the results of data-taking immediately without needing complex equipment or long periods of time. They allow students to collect data at different speeds i.e. via individual particles/photons or in fast-forward mode. They show simplified idealized systems, such as perfect sources and detectors and a simple intercept-resend eavesdropping attack, to focus on key ideas and reduce cognitive load. They help students make connections between physical representations of the experimental setup and mathematical representations, e.g. the key bits, the error rate and the error probability.
In what follows, we describe three different QKD protocols and show how they are implemented in the simulations. We then describe how the design of the simulations was refined using feedback from individual student volunteer sessions and in-class trials to ensure their educational effectiveness. We conclude with an outlook for future work.
II. THE BB84 PROTOCOL
The best known quantum key distribution protocol is the so-called BB84 protocol, published by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. 4 In this protocol, Alice sends Bob a sequence of photons/particles in one of four different states chosen at random from two conjugate bases. For each photon/particle, Bob chooses one of the bases at random and makes a measurement in this basis. Once all measurements have been made, Alice and Bob exchange their bases (not their measurement outcomes!) and discard those measurements where their bases did not coincide. In order to test for an eavesdropper, they compare a randomly selected subset of their measurement outcomes (which they then discard, as these are not anymore secure) and check for errors. If the error rate is below a certain threshold, the unshared outcomes form the raw key, which can be processed further classically.
The Quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol) using polarized photons 18 simulation (see Fig. 1 ) uses single photons and photon polarization as a physical realization of the BB84
protocol. At startup, the simulation shows an Introduction view, with introductory text and a start button. The introductory text includes the learning goals, e.g. "to help Alice and Bob decide whether or not they have generated a secure key. How can they tell that an eavesdropper Eve has infiltrated their experiment?". This Introduction view is similar across all the QKD simulations. For the simulations using single photons, pressing the start button shows an animation depicting virtual reality goggles that allows students to "see" the photons in the simulation. The photon visualization was developed in an earlier study. 
Bob is equipped with a polarization analyzer and a single photon detector. For each measurement, Bob chooses one of the two bases at random and and measures the polarization of the photon. In the simulation, it is assumed that Alice tells Bob each time she sends a photon. Bob either registers a photon in his detector or not, determining his outcome. For example, if Bob orients his analyzer horizontally but does not detect a photon, his outcome is "vertical"; if he does detect a photon, his outcome is "horizontal". In real experiments, polarizing beam splitters and two detectors would be used, so that each orientation would have its own detector and Bob would detect the photon in both cases. and the horizontal and +45 orientations the value 0.
As can be seen in Fig. 1 , the simulation shows the basis and outcome for each individ- 
III. THE TWO-STATE PROTOCOL
In 1992 Bennett demonstrated that four states are more than are actually needed for
QKD.
21 QKD requires at least two states, so that Eve is unable to unambiguously distinguish between them without introducing some errors in the key. However, Bennett demonstrated that two states are also sufficient if they are not orthogonal e.g. using photon polarization states |H and | + 45 .
The Quantum key distribution using two non-orthogonal states 22 simulation (Fig. 2) demonstrates this two-state protocol using single photons and photon polarization for the physical realization. Similarly to the BB84 simulation, Alice sends polarized photons to Bob, who is equipped with a polarization analyzer and single photon detector. However, Alice now uses two non-orthogonal polarization states rather than four polarization states.
In the simulation, Alice randomly prepares each photon with either 0 • (horizontal) or +45
• polarization. The horizontal polarization is assigned a bit value of 0, the +45 polarization a bit value of 1.
For each measurement, Bob randomly sets his analyzer to one of two directions orthogonal and Bob publicly communicate to determine which photons were detected. This sequence of 0s and 1s forms the raw key. As for the other QKD protocols, they then exchange a small number of their bit values (which they then discard as they are not anymore secure)
to check for errors.
In the simulation, Eve uses an intercept-resend attack where she uses the same orienta- • and does not detect a photon and hence sends +45
• , then Bob can detect the photon in state |V , leading to an error. The error probability is 25%, the same as for the BB84
protocol.
Excepting the Quantum key distribution with entangled spin 1/2 particles simulation 
IV. THE EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PROTOCOL
In 1991, Ekert suggested a QKD protocol using entangled particle pairs rather than individual particles and measurements along three axes. 23 This scheme was simplified by
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin in 1992 to measurements along two orthogonal axes. 24 This simplified scheme is implemented in the simulation described here.
The Quantum key distribution with entangled spin 1/2 particles 25 simulation uses a source that emits entangled spin 1/2 particle pairs (see Fig. 3 ). In the simulation, the two particles in the pair are emitted back-to-back each with opposite spin components. The particle pair is in the maximally entangled quantum state non-uniform magnetic field aligned along a given axis. For spin 1/2 particles, the particles separate into two discrete streams, one deflected in the positive direction (in the simulation defined as measurement outcome 1), one deflected in the negative direction (measurement outcome 0) along this axis. Alice and Bob orient their Stern-Gerlach apparatuses independently of one another at random along two orthogonal axes, denoted X and Z. Alice and Bob then exchange a small number of their actual measurement outcomes (which they then discard from the key as they are not anymore secure) to check for errors.
As for all the QKD simulations, students can insert an eavesdropper Eve who intercepts the particles sent to Bob (shown in Fig. 3 ). For the "Random orientations" setting, Eve measures the particle's spin component in the same way as Bob using a Stern-Gerlach apparatus oriented at random along X or Z. She then sends a particle on to Bob with the spin state she measured, e.g. if Eve measures spin-up along Z, she sends a particle in the state | ↑ to Bob.
Errors occur in 50% of cases where Eve by chance chooses the wrong basis, i.e. a different one to Alice and Bob. As Alice and Eve have used different bases, their outcomes are completely uncorrelated. Eve's measurement changes the spin state of the particle. Eve then passes on a particle to Bob that has equal probabilities for outcomes 0 and 1 in his basis. As Eve guesses the incorrect basis 50% of the time, and 50% of these cases lead to an error, the quantum bit error rate is 25%, the same as for the BB84 and two-state protocols. bits and allowing a test to compare for errors (see Fig. 3 ), this simulation showed a graph of the error probability versus the number of key bits. This graph showed how the error probability converges to 0.25 in the limit of a large number of measurements, if random orientations are chosen and the eavesdropper is inserted. The other difference was in the key bits panel, which did not highlight measurements where Eve chose the wrong basis (the turquoise highlighting of the middle right panel in Fig. 3) . In what follows, we motivate why these two changes were incorporated into all the QKD simulations described in sections II, III and IV in light of the 2014 results. In both the 2014 courses the simulation activity was given as a homework assignment.
Students had one week to complete the assignment which did not contribute to the course grade. In the lecture following the submission date, students were asked to complete a short post-test, which was identical for both levels. Students in the introductory course were only given the definition of a key in the lecture and otherwise did not discuss ideas of cryptography during class time, so that students had essentially no prior knowledge and were learning about QKD from the simulation. At the advanced level, this particular protocol was not discussed during class time, but the BB84 protocol had been discussed in detail.
We coded each of the activity responses as correct, partially correct, incorrect and unanswered. All percentages quoted below refer to fully correct answers. On the whole, the 2014 activity questions were well answered (N=73, 73.3% correct for the introductory level, and N=14, 92.0% correct for the advanced level), with however two exceptions seen at both levels.
The first common difficulty seen was in response to the question " Therefore, we replaced the error probability graph by the most recent key bits panel shown at the bottom middle of Fig. 3 , that lets Alice and Bob compare 20 bits for errors. Students can see that they need to discard any bits that were shared (the gaps in this panel in Fig. 1 ),
and that if an eavesdropper is detected they need to discard the entire key (the feedback in this panel in Fig. 3 ). This panel is available in all the QKD simulations described in sections II, III and IV. We also introduced the turquoise highlighting shown in the middle right panel in Fig. 3 , that highlights all measurements where Eve chose the wrong basis. This allows students to see that not all of these measurements lead to an error (e.g. of the three measurements highlighted in this way in Fig. 3 , only two of them have an error). We also modified the activity, to extend the focus on how errors come about using two additional questions that asked students to explain using a specific example how an error occurs, what they can say about Eve's orientation when an error occurs and whether an error occurs each time Eve chooses the wrong orientation.
We used the revised version of the Quantum key distribution with entangled spin 1/2 particle pairs simulation shown in Fig. 3 The post-test questions are given in the Appendix. Results for both years for the in- .7% respectively for the three questions (N=14), but students likely had substantial prior knowledge so that the outcomes do not relate to learning from the simulation alone.
In summary, these evaluation results point to the simulation being effective in helping students make sense of QKD at both the introductory and advanced levels. They point to the revisions incorporated into the QKD simulation and activity being successful in improving students' understanding. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
QKD is a relevant and useful topic for inclusion in quantum mechanics courses at both the introductory and advanced levels, in terms of limited prior quantum mechanics knowledge needed, the rapidly growing field of quantum information technology and the link to motivating real-world applications. We have described four interactive simulations that support the learning and teaching of QKD. The simulations demonstrate the basic principles of QKD using three different protocols, and using either polarized single photons or spin 1/2 particles as physical realizations of qubits. The simulations have been shown in preliminary studies to be effective at helping students learn about QKD both at the introductory and the advanced undergraduate levels. Alice and Bob decide to compare all of their bits to determine if Eve was intercepting. They find that they do not agree on the last bit of the key.
2) For this last bit, what orientation must Eve have used for her measurement?
A) X B) Z C) It is not possible to tell from the information given.
3) For this last bit, what value did Eve obtain in her measurement?
A) 0 1) 1 C) It is not possible to tell from the information given.
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